This paper uses an analytical model to examine when it makes sense to provide incentives to innovators to adopt a new product. The model allows for separate segments of innovators and imitators, each of which follows a Bass-type diffusion process. Interestingly "seeding" the market is optimal for a limited range of situations and these do not appear to include those where there is a downturn in sales (chasm) as sales move from the first to the second segment.
Background
The diffusion of new products is one of the most widely studied topics in marketing (Hauser et al., 2004) . A large percentage of this work is based on the Bass (1969) model. This model parsimoniously describes S-shaped diffusion patterns by assuming a single diffusion pattern with separate coefficients capturing innovation and imitation tendencies.
Research focused on multiple diffusion processes has appeared in various forms. For example, Norton and Bass (1987) studied the adoption of successive generations of technology. Closer to the current problem, several researchers have looked at diffusion across countries, i.e. different populations (Dekimpe et al., 2000; Gatignon et al., 1989; Kalish et al., 1995; Putsis and Sen, 2001; Putsis et al., 1997; Takada and Jain, 1991; Tellis et al., 2003) . In contrast to these papers, this paper looks at different segments within the same geographic area and time period. It does so using a latent class approach, rather than capturing heterogeneity within a single population (e.g., Bemmaor and Lee, 2002) . Perhaps the closest work is that of Jain et al. (1995) which examined optimal sampling in the context of a single population and suggested it tends to be about 5% of the population for durables.
A related area of work concerns the impact adoption by others has on the value of a good, aka network externalities (cf Naik et al., 2003) . Much of this work focuses on the implications of network effects on company behavior and the emergence of industry standards (e.g., Arthur, 1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Gupta et al., 1999; Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . For example, Sun et al. (2004) consider four strategies for innovators in a market with network effects. Other work centers on the notion of an information cascade (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Golder and Tellis, 2004) .
Some work explicitly considers two segments. Goldenberg et al., (2002) used cellular automata to simulate diffusion in two segments and found it can produce a "saddle" (a slow down in and then resumption of growth) in the diffusion pattern. Similarly Muller and Yogev (2004) studied 35 electronics markets and found empirical evidence for a saddle in 26 of them. In addition, Van den Bulte and Joshi (2005) built a two segment model and showed that for 33 cases it fits better than single population models. We use a similar model in this paper as the basis for our analytical results.
Other work has focused on the lead time until a product "takes-off" (Golder and Tellis, 1997; Kohli et al., 1999) . Although this work does not explicitly consider two segments, the pattern established is consistent with a delay in time before a product enters a broader (mass) market.
The focus on firm behavior (rather than describing or predicting customer behavior) has a long history. Horsky and Simon (1983) incorporated the impact of advertising on diffusion, Robinson and Lakhani (1975) considered price, and Kalish and Lilien (1983) examined the role of price subsidies. Mahajan and Muller (1998) examined when it is optimal to target the mass market rather than innovators using a two segment model of pure innovators and pure imitators. This paper extends that work by considering the benefits of a subsidy to innovators for the purpose of speeding adoption in the second (larger) segment when the two segments have a propensity to both innovate and imitate. This paper first describes when it is profitable to "seed" a diffusion process by giving away a product in a two segment world. The impact of varying model parameters on the
